Analisis Konseptual sebagai Penerjemahan Epistemik dalam Teori Hukum
Keywords:
analisis konseptual, epistemologi, teori hukum, yurisprudens plural, conceptual analysis, epistemology, legal theory, pluralist jurisprudenceAbstract
Artikel ini menyajikan gambaran metodologis tentang analisis konseptual dalam teori hukum kontemporer. Khususnya, artikel ini memandang bahwa analisis konseptual masih berperan penting sebagai metode dalam teori hukum sepanjang kita memahaminya bukan sebagai analisis linguistik murni ataupun esensialisme metafisik. Analisis konseptual perlu dipahami sebagai penyelidikan normatif-interpretatif terhadap struktur praktik hukum, atau apa yang saya sebut sebagai penerjemahan epistemik. Tesis utama di sini terdiri dari: (1) analisis konseptual dalam teori hukum tidak dapat direduksi ke dalam klarifikasi semantik semata, melainkan rekonstruksi reflektif terhadap struktur normatif praktik hukum; (2) otoritasnya berasal bukan hanya dari intuisi a priori, namun dari perannya dalam menstrukturkan praktik justifikasi internal hukum; (3) batasan analisis konseptual akan menjadi jelas ketika dituntut untuk menjawab pertanyaan empiris yang melampaui kompetensi metodologisnya.
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This article presents a methodological overview of conceptual analysis in contemporary legal theory. In particular, this article argues that conceptual analysis continues to play an important role as a method in legal theory, provided that we understand it neither as purely linguistic analysis nor as metaphysical essentialism. Conceptual analysis must be understood as a normative-interpretive investigation of the structure of legal practice, or what I refer to as epistemic translation. The main theses here are: (1) conceptual analysis in legal theory cannot be reduced to mere semantic clarification, but rather constitutes a reflective reconstruction of the normative structure of legal practice; (2) its authority derives not only from a priori intuition, but from its role in structuring the internal justificatory practices of law; (3) the limitations of conceptual analysis become evident when it is required to answer empirical questions that exceed its methodological competence.
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